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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
No.
9281

vs.

THEODORE I. GEURTS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant and Defendant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
THEODORE I. GEURTS was elected City Commissioner
of Salt Lake City in the 195 7 election. His term of office began
on January 6, 1958, to run through January 4, 1962.
On July 13, 1959, the Salt Lake County Grand Jury
returned an indictment against Commissioner Geurts, charging
him with the crime of official neglect and misconduct in office,
1
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in violation of Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 36, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. The indictment contained six counts (R. 82).
On the 22nd day of October, 1959, Judge Merrill Faux
granted the motion of the defendant to quash counts Nos. 1,
4, 5 and 6 of the indictment. The motion to quash was denied
as to counts 2 and 3. On the 2nd day of November, 1959, the
court ordered the District Attorney to furnish to the defendant
a bill of particulars as to counts 2 and 3. This bill of particulars
was never furnished (R. 82).
On the 15th day of February, 1960, the District Attorney
filed a civil action entitled ((State of Utah, plaintiff. vs. Theodore I. Geurts, Defendant," which action was brought under
the provisions of Title 77, Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, for the purpose of removing the
defendant from office (R. 1, 2). The accusation was in three
counts. Count 1 revived Count 1 of the indictment, which had
theretofore been quashed by Judge Faux. Counts 2 and 3 of
the accusation were almost identical in form with Counts
2 and 3 of the indictment, which Counts were at the time of
the accusation still standing against the defendant, but upon
which counts no bill of particular had been filed.
We will not at this time relate the several motions and
orders in regard both to the criminal case and the civil case
which preceded the trial of the civil case, although these motions and orders form the basis of some of the points relied
upon by the defendant in this appeal. The substance of these
preliminary proceedings will be discussed fully in connection
with the points to which they are applicable.
The civil case for the removal of the defendant from his
2
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office proceeded to trial on the 2nd day of May, 1960, before
the Honorable Ran Van Cott, Jr., sitting with a jury. At the
close of the State's case Judge Van Cott granted the motion
of the defendant to dismiss Count 1 on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty (R. 276).
After hearing all of the evidence the jury returned a verdict
finding the defendant guilty on Count 2 and not guilty on
Count 3 of the accusation (R. 58, 60). The defendant filed
a motion for a new trial (R. 62), which was denied (R. 74).
Subsequently the court entered an order removing the defendant
from his office as city commissioner (R. 70). This appeal is
taken from such order of removal.

THE EVIDENCE
Count 1
Mr. J. W. Reed, a licensed real estate broker in Salt Lake
City, had had business dealings with Commissioner Geurts
and his family prior to the time that Mr. Geurts was elected
to the City Commission (R. 224). Early in January, 1959,
Mr. Reed approached Commissioner Geurts in an attempt to
sell the Commissioner and his brothers a piece of property in
northwest Salt Lake City belonging to some people named
Langford. Commissioner Geurts took the details in regard
to the Langford property and informed Mr. Reed that he would
discuss it with his brothers to see whether or not they would
be interested in the purchase (R. 217). During this conversation Mr. Reed asked Commissioner Geurts whether or not
the city might be interested in some property in the vicinity
of the Rose Park Golf Course (R. 228). Commissioner
3
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Geurts informed Mr. Reed that he, Commissioner Geurts,
had nothing to do with the purchase of property for the golf
course (R. 218). City golf courses were under the jurisdiction
of City Parks Department, which was administered by
Commissioner L. C. Romney. Commissioner Geurts informed
Reed that if he wished to attempt to sell the city any property
for this purpose, negotiations ·would have to be carried on
with Comrnissioner Romney. There were no further meetings
or conversations between Commissioner Geurts and Mr. Reed
until May 11, 1959 (R. 229).
Reed thereafter made contact with the City Parks Department and did sell to the City a tract of land belonging to the
estate of a man named Hansen (R. 219) . The purchase of
this land was handled by the Parks Department in the ordinary
course of business. It came before the City Comnussion as
a whole, and the purchase was approved by all of the Commissioners, including Commissioner Geurts, on April 30, 1959.
Commissioner Geurts' sole connection with this deal was in
voting to purchase the property (R. 230). He did not contact
any other commissioner to urge the purchase, nor did he speak
in favor of the purchase (R. 140).
On May 11, 1959, Mr. Reed came to the office of Commissioner Geurts, and stated that he wished to make a campaign
contribution to the Commissioner. He did make the Commissioner a check in the amount of $119.00 (R. 221). Commissioner Geurts then took this check to a subordinate and
asked him to cash the check at the City Treasurer's office
(R. 234). Mr. Geurts then deposited this cash in his own
account. In his testimony Mr. Reed was not very clear as to
4
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why the amount of this check given to Mr. Geurts approximated 10% of the real estate commission which he had received
on the sale of the Hansen property to the City. He was, however, very definite in his statement to the effect that he had
never mentioned a payment, campaign contribution or otherwise, to Mr. Geurts until after the deal was entirely consummated (R. 230).
At the close of his successful campaign for the City Commissionership, Commissioner Geurts' campaign committee had
a number of unpaid bills. After these bills had remained
unpaid for a period of time Mr. Geurts paid them himself
from his own bank account. He reimbursed himself whenever
contributions were made thereafter (R. 238).
On the basis of the evidence thus introduced, the court,
at the conclusion of the State's evidence, granted a motion
dismissing Count 1.
Count 2
During the Spring months of 1959, a number of small
trees and shrubs were taken from the City Cemetery to the
home of Commissioner Geurts and to the home of his sonin-laVl. The shrubs and trees thus taken consisted of four
arborvitae bushes, three small spruce trees, and two bridal
wreath plants (R. 298). The shrubs and trees in question
were not the property of Salt Lake City. They belonged to
individuals from whose cemetery lots they had been removed
in the course of the preparation of a gravesite (R. 286). By
long time custom of the City Cemetery, whenever it \vas necessary to remove a tree or a shrub incident to the preparation
5
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of a grave, the owner was notified. If he wanted the tree or
shrub it was turned over to him. If he did not want such
shrub or tree they were given away to anyone that desired
the1n, or in those cases where no one desired them they were
hauled directly to the city dump, if there was a large number
available at one time, or were placed on a dump in the city
cemetery until a sufficient number was accumulated, at which
time they would be hauled to the dump in a large truck (R.
287). The uncontradicted testimony of the city cemetery
e1nployees was that it required less cemetery force labor to
drop these shrubs and trees off at Commissioner Geurts' home
than it would to haul them all the way to the dump (R. 288).
In each instance except one, Commissioner Geurts or his sonin-law had prepared a hole for the planting of the tree or
shrub, and the cemetery employees merely dropped the item
ofi near the house (R. 190). On one occasion, however, due
to a misunderstanding, the city cemetery employees did plant
two arborvitae trees, and in doing so had to expand the planting
hole already dug by Commissioner Geurts, but which proved
too small to receive the tree (R. 207). There was also testimony to the effect that on one occasion when a truck was on
the way to the city dump and dropped a tree or a shrub at
Commissioner Geurts' home on the way to the dump, Commissioner Geurts ordered the city employees to load onto
the truck a pile of trash which had been collected from the
Church farm which adjoined Commissioner Geurts' home
(R. 206). The evidence, however '\vas that if such hauling
had not been done by the city cemetery truck, it would have
been done without charge on request by a truck from the
City Street Department, in accordance with the policy of
6
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the City Street Department to render such service to all citizens (R. 278). The only evidence of any city property actually
received by Commissioner Geurts was some three yards of
top soil which was placed on the roots of the trees in transit
to his home in order to keep them from drying out. The jury
found Commissioner Geurts guilty on this count.

Count 3
In the Fall of 1958 Commissioner Geurts had been approached by the City Attorney and also by an official from the
City Court with a request that a pay raise be granted to certain
girls doing legal stenographic work. The evidence in the case
is clear that these girls \\rere receiving somewhat less than the
going pay for legal secretaries in Salt Lake City (R. 159) .
Commissioner Geurts informed these department heads that
he felt the girls shoudl have a raise, but that no money was
available until after the first of January of 1959 (R. 152-154).
He promised a raise effective as of that time. Shortly after
the first of January this matter was again called to Mr. Geurts'
attention. In the meantime, however, there was before the
State Legislature a bill which would provide for a sales tax
for the benefit of city governments. The City Commissioners
had informally decided among themselves that no pay raises
would be granted during the session of the Legislature. Commissioner Geurts agreed to recommend the girls in question
for a pay raise immediaely following the session of the Legislature and in the interim to grant them overtime checks for
time not actually worked to bring their pay up to the level
on which it would be after the raises were granted. This was
7
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done (R. 165). Three girls received approximately $7.50 a
week extra for a period of some six weeks. The jury found
Commissioner Geurts not guilty of malfeasance for this action.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
The defendant relies upon the following listed points as
a basis for seeking a reversal of judgment of the court below.
These points are not here listed chronologically according to
the time of the occurrence of the alleged errors, but are grouped
for listing and discussion according to subject matter:
1. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion to

dismiss the accusation on the grounds and for the reason that
Title 77, Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 2, Utah Code Annotated
195 3 is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be in violation
of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
2. The court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements

of the offense of malfeasance in office.
3. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion to
dismission Count No. 1 of the accusation.
4. The court erred in denying the defendant the right to
take the deposition of witnesses prior to the trial, or in the
alternative, the right to have a preliminary hearing.
5. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a n1istrial as to Counts 2 and 3, made after the dismissal
of Count 1, and also in denying the motion for a new trial.
8
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6. The court erred in denying the challenge for cause
to the Juror Ray H. Wilson.
7. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion for

a new trial on the grounds that the Jurors Ikeda
had answered falsely to certain voir dire questions,
answers had prevented the defendant from taking
for cause or from intelligently exercising his
challenges.

and Jensen
which false
a challenge
peremptory

8. The court erred in overruling the defendant's objections

to questions on cross-examination asked by the District Attorney of the defendant's character witness Smith.
9. The court erred in denying the defendant's motion
in arrest of judgment made on the grounds that Chapter 7,
Section 77, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, has been superseded by Rule 65 (b) ( 1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACCUSATION
ON THE GROUNDS AND FOR THE REASON THAT
TITLE 77, CHAPTER 7, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 IS SO VAGUE, INDEFINITE AND
UNCERTAIN AS TO BE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7,
ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of
Utah provides:
C(No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
9
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That this prohibition applies in civil proceedings as well as
criminal proceedings was decided in the case of Hilton Bros.
Motor Company v. District Court, 82 Utah 372, 25 P. 2d. 595.
While the right to hold public office does not have all
of the characteristics of a true property right, it is such a
property right as is protected by the due process clause. This
matter was considered by the Supreme Court of Montana in
the case of State v. Nor by, 165 Pac. 2d. 302. Section 27, Article
3 of the Constitution of Montana is identical in wording with
Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The Montana court stated in this case:
''Of course the right to a public office is not property
or an estate that may be passed by will, inheritance or
other transfer. It is a public trust. However, the incumbent of an office for a definite term, carrying a
fixed salary, certainly has a property interest therein
within the meaning of Section 27, Article 3 of our
Constitution * * *. The right of an elected public
official to possess and use the office and to exercise the
privilege of the rights therein to the exclusion of others
and until properly removed, certainly constituted a
property interest within the meaning of these sections."
Under the holding in the case of Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. I, 88 L. ed. 497, the right to hold state office is not protected by the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. In this section, however, we do cite some federal
cases, because, as was pointed out by this court in the case of
Unternzyer v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.
2d 881:
''The due process clause of the state constitution is
substantially the same as the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments to the Federal Constitution. Decisions of
10
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the Supreme Court of the United States on the due
process clauses of the Federal Constitution are 'highly
persuasive' as to the application of that clause of our
state constitution.''
There is a well established line of cases under these
provisions holding that no statute may be enforced where the
language of the statute is so vague, uncertain or indefinite
that a reader of the statute cannot detremine readily from the
face of the statute what acts are prohibited thereby.
One of the landmarks cases in this field of the law, and
a case wkhich is commonly cited by cases which follow is the
case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 296 U.S. 385
70 L. ed. 322, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1926. This case was concerned with an 8 hour day
statute of the state of Oklahoma which carried certain penal
provisions. In holding this penal law in violation of the 14th
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
The dividing line between what is lawful and
unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen can
not be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes
whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute
cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime
and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly
expressed that the ordinary person can intelligent! y
choose, in advance, what course it is unlawful for him
to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that
the citizen may act upon the one conception of its
requiren1ents and the courts upon another.
cc

•••

" * * * The result is that the application of the law
depends not upon a word of fixed meaning in itself,
1l
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or one made definite by statutory or judicial definition,
or by the context or other legitimate aid to its construction, but upon the probably varying impressions of
juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be
included within particular localities. The constitutional
guaranty of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon
a support so equivocal."

..

Another frequently cited case in this field of the law arose
111 regard to a Utah statute. One Joseph Musser and others
were accused by the State of Utah of advocating the practice
of polygamy. Evidently the State, not having sufficient evidence to prove the actual practice of polygamy by the defendants, charged them with advocating the practice in violation
of Section 103-11-1, U.C.A. 1943, which made it an indictable
misdemeanor for any two or more persons to conspire ttto
commit any act injurious * * * to public morals." A conviction was had in the Third Judicial District Court, which
conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court of the United States on the contention of the defendant
that the statute he was accused of violating was so vague,
indefinite and uncertain as to be in violation of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That
court declined to interpret the Utah statute and remanded it
to the Supreme Court of the State of lTtah for interpretation
with the following admonition:
nit is obvious that this is no narrowly drawn statute.
We do not presume to give an interpretation as to what
it may include. Standing by itself, it would seem to be
warrant for conviction for agreement to do almost any
act which a judge and jury might find at the moment
contrary to his or its notions of what was good for
12
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health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or order. In
some States the phrase ·injurious to public morals·
would be likely to punish acts which it would not punish
in others because of the varying policies on such matters, as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility
of gambling. This led to the inquiry as to whether the
statute attempts to cover so much that it effectively
covers nothing. Statutes defining crimes may fail of
their purpose if they do not provide sotne reasonable
standards of guilt. See, for example, United States v.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 65 L. ed 516, 41
S. Ct. 298, 14 ALR 1045. Legislation may run afoul
of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give
adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding,
to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with
which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying
those who are accused."
This case is Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 92 L. ed. 562.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reconsidered the
case in light of the decision from the Supremt Court of the
United States. In a decision written by Mr. Justice Wade,
the court held that they could give no narrower interpretation
to the statute than the words of the statute themselves would
seem to imply. The court further held that interpreted as
the words of the statute must be interpreted, the statute was
vague, uncertain and contrary to the provisions of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The
conviction was, therefore, reversed. The following pertinent
language is from the Utah Supreme Court decision, State v.
Musser, 223 P. 2d 193:
CCThe problem which we must decide as stated above,
must be answered in the negative. The argument before
this court has developed no reason why we should
13
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believe that the legislature intended, in using this
language, that it should be limited to a meaning less
broad than the words therein used would indicate in
their ordinary sense. No language in this or any other
statute of this state or other law thereof or any historical fact or surrounding circumstance connected with
the enactment of this statute has been pointed to as
indicating that the legislature intended any limitation
thereon other than that expressed on the face of the
words used. We are therefore unable to place a construction on these words which limits their meaning
beyond their general meaning. The conviction of the
defendants thereunder cannot be upheld. This part of
the statute is therefore void for vagueness and uncertainty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution."
In the case of City of Price v. Jaynes} 191 P. 2d 606, the
defendant had been convicted of violation of a city ordinance
of Price City; which provided in part:
((Section 1. The right of the people of the City of
Price, County of Carbon, State of Utah, to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
(Section 2. Any person violating any of the provisions
of this ordinance, or any section thereof, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor * * * ''
The court struck down this ordinance in the following
language:
((In the case of this ordinance we have a naked declaration of a policy or the recognition of a right of the
people of the City of Price to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures without any definition of what, in the
vanous situations, constitutes an unlawful search or
setzure.
14
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"This ordinance does not reveal whether it is directed against an unreasonable seizure of a person in
his house or apart from it or both; whether it is intended to prohibit an unlawful seizure of papers or
effects from the body of a person in his house or club
house, or structure in the City of Price or from the home
of a person independently of seizure of or from his
person.
"As stated before, the Fourth Amendment has been
implemented by Federal and state legislation defining
reasonable searches and seizures and the basis for the
same and the manner of accomplishing such search
and seizure under different laws which provide for the
search and/or seizure and the conditions thereof. There
has usually been sufficient in the legislation to permit
delineation between what purports to be a reasonable
or an unreasonable search or seizure.
"The ordinance here in question is expressive only
of an existing right and a declared policy. It does
not set out with sufficient definiteness the act or acts
prohibited or denounced.
"The declared policy is not sufficiently implemented
by standards from which it can be determined what is
or what is not under various situations a lawful or
unlawful search or seizure. Evidently the test of what
is an unreasonable search or seizure is left to standards
not prescribed in the ordinance of Price City but to the
exploration in fields of law which prescribe such
standards for the state of Utah or the other states.
This leaves the tests too much in the air and dependent
in each case on what the magistrate hearing the case
may within the light of his very limited or plenary
knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable.
nThe acts condemned as unreasonable searches and
seizures are nowhere defined in reference to the results necessary to be accomplished. The ordinance is
1)
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general and vague and entirely too indefinite and
uncertain. For the reasons above stated, the ordinance
is a nullity."
Another Utah case setting forth this principle is the case
of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, Utah 202
P. 2d 727. In that case the court stated:
nit is a principle too familiar to require citation of
authority, that penal statutes, to be constitutional, must
be clear and definite in their terms so that there may
be known exactly what conduct is prescribed."
Some cases frorn other states applying the same principle
are People of tbe State of l\1ichigan v. Joseph Sarnoff, 140
A.L.R. 1206:
c]t is fundamental that a penal law cannot be sustained unless its mandates are so clearly expressed
that any ordinay person can determine in advance what
he may or what he may not do under it. People v.
Goulding, 275 Mich. 353, 359, 266 NW 378.
~

Another such case is State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery
Co., (Minn.) 21 N.W. 2d. 792, 163 A.L.R. 1108. The language of the court was as follows:
((In the Northwest Poultry case, this court stated,
203 Minn. 440, 281 NW 754: (The uncertainty hit at
is not the difficulty of ascertaining whether close cases
fall within or without the prohibition of a statute, but
whether the standard established by the statute is so
uncertain that it cannot be determined with reasonable
definiteness that any particular act is disapproved.
Nash v. United States, 299 U.S. 373, 33 S Ct 780, 57
L ed 1232; United States v. Wurzbach, 280 US 396,
50 S Ct 167, 74 L ed 508.'
nit was also stated at page 441 of 203 Minn., 281
16
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NW 754: 'Due process requires that penal legislation
expressed in general and flexible terms furnish a test
based on knowable criteria which men of common
intelligence who come in contact with the statute may
use with reasonable safety in determining its command. Collins v. Com. of Kentucky, 234 US 634, 34
S Ct. 924, 58 L ed 1510."
See also Werner v. City of Knoxville, 161 F. Supp. 9. A
very good annotation is found on this subject at 83 L. ed., page
893.
One of the latest expressions of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah in this matter is the case of State v. Packard,
250 P. 2d. 561. In this case the court struck down as being
too vague and indefinite a statute making a criminal offense
"failure to register with the Industrial Commission before
commencing employment." In striking down this statute the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, stated:
"The limitations of language are such that neither
absolute exactitude of expression nor complete precison of meaning are to be expected,and such standard
cannot be required. On the other hand there is no
disagreement among the courts that where a rule is
set up, the violations of which subjects one to criminal
punishment, the restrictions upon conduct should be
described with sufficient certainty, so that persons of
ordinary intelligence desiring to obey the law, may
know how to govern themselves in conformity with it,
and that no one should be compelled at the peril of
life, liberty or property, to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes. Price v. Jaynes, supra; State v.
Musser, supra; U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. ed 516; Stromberg v. People
of State of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. ed.
1117; Connally v. General Construction Co., supra;
17
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Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618,
83 L. ed 888; see Law Ed. Annotations in connection
with latter two cases.
((Concerning the question of uncertainty or vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be in accord
that the test a statute must meet to be valid is: It must
be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what
their conduct must be to conform to its requirements;
(b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just
what constitutes the offense with which he is charged,
and (c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and
application by those charged with responsibility of
applying and enforcing it."
A statute is not void for indefiniteness or uncertainty if
any one of the following conditions exist:
A. 'fhe words used by the statute in describing the prohibited activity are of such well known and precise meaning
that reasonable men cannot differ as to their application and
all reasonable men taking any given set of circumstances could
determine without doubt whether or not such set of circumstances fit within or without the prohibition; or
B. Though the v1ords themselves may not be subject to
such definiteness, the statute in question itself sets up tests
and standards to aid in determining whether or not any
given act may fall within or without the terms of a prohibition;
or
C. The terms used in the statute are elsewhere defined
in the statutes of the governing body which enacted the statute
in question.
Let us examine the statute under which this defendant
18
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was convicted to determine how it meets any of the foregoing
requirements. Section 77-7-1 provides

CCAll officers not liable to impeachment shall be
subject to removal for high crimes, misdemeanors and
malfeasance in office as jn this chapter provided."
We can ignore the first two terms, cchigh crimes" and ccmisdemeanors,'' for the reason that the state did not accuse the
defendant of such actions. The accusation clearly accuses him
of ((malfeasance in office in violation of Title 77, Chapter 7,
Sections 1 and 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." We must
consider this statute then as if it merely read ccall officers not
liable to impeachment should be subject to removal for malfeasance in office as in this chapter provided."
Neither the chapter in question nor any other provtston
in the laws of the State of Utah which we have been able to
find purports to define the term ccmalfeasance." It is a term
that means what the individual using or hearing it thinks
it means. This is plainly evident from the Judge's instructions
on the matter, which will be discussed in the next succeeding
section. Nor can any help be found by resorting to the common
law. CCMalfeasance" merely means wrong doing, and the
word umalfeasance" is just as vague, uncertain and indefinite
as are the words ((wrong doing." The authors of American
Jurisprudence make the following statement in Vol. 43, page
39:
CCNot infrequently public officers are made removable
or suspendable for malfeasance or misfeasance, or for
misconduct or gross misconduct or for malconduct in
office. These terms are difficult of exact definition."
Perkins on Criminal Law discusses the uncertain meaning
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of such terms as malfeasance and misfeasance and misconduct
in office. On page 412 of this work the following statement
ts found:
((Confusion has been injected into this area of the
law by resorting to a multiplicity of names or terms
with varying degrees of generality or specificity. Misconduct in office', for example, is used at times merely
as a literal statement. In this sense it does not indicate
a crime, but merely one of the ingredients of a crime
and the phrase tnay have either one or two different
meanings when employed to indicate a crime. This is
because of the fact that some of the offenses of this
nature have specific names of their own, such as ~ex
tortion' or ~oppression', whereas others do not. Thus
the phrase rnay be used in a generic sense as in a statement ~oppression is one type of misconduct in office,'
or it may be used as a specific name of the crime in
referring to an offense of this nature which has no
name of its own, such as a case in which a prosecuting
attorney corruptly procured the release of a prisoner
by improper use of a bond. When used to indicate a
crime in either of these two senses mentioned, misconduct in office is corrupt misbehavior by an officer
in the execution of the duties of his office, or while
acting under color of his office.
((While misconduct in office is a term frequently
employed, many substitutes have been used for this
phrase in all of the meanings suggested, and the definition could be reworded by the substitution of any
of the following: official misconduct, misbehavior in
office, malconduct in office, malpractice in office, misconduct in office and corruption in office. No doubt
others have found their way into the cases.
((In addition to the terms used to represent the entire
area will be found others to indicate certain parts thereof and these partitioning phrases may be based either
20
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on the nature of the misbehavior or upon the mode
of the misbehavior."
If the Legislature is going to describe an offense by s.uch
general terms, it is necessary in order to preserve the constitutionality of the provisions that the Legislature either define
the tern1 or lay down standards of conduct by which a person
reading the law can detremine what is intended by the Legislature. We will submit that such has not been done in regard
to this statute. Furthermore, the jury in their deliberations
were not in any way helped out by the instructions of the
court, as v.-e will point out in the next succeeding section.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE.
Counsel does not mean to criticize the trial judge for the
vague, uncertain and indefinite instructions which were given
to the jury as to \Vhat constitutes malfeasance in office. The
defects in the judge's instructions are inherent in the statute
itself. Neither the district attorney for the defense attorney,
in spite of diligent efforts, were very bel pful to the court in
their requested instructions. The court in telling the jury
what was malfeasance had to let the jury rely upon a subjective
standard, as indeed the words of the statute will permit
nothing else. The court instructed the jury as follows in regard
to the definition of malfeasance:
((For the purpose of this case, malfeasance in office
is defined as follows: Malfeasance is the conscious
doing of a wrongful act in his official capacity with
the knowledge upon his part at the time of doing the
21
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same that it is wrongful and that he had no right to
do the same,and may consist of any one of the following, to-wit: Evil doing, ill conduct, the doing of what
one ought not to do, the unjust performance of some
act which the party had no right to do, or the commission of some act which is positively unlawful."
Inasmuch as the defendant was accused of no high crime
or rnisdemeanor in the accusation itself, the last few words of
the instructions seem surplusage, but let us look at the others.
Malfeasance is evil doing. Evil doing by whose standards?
By the standards of each individual member of the jury? Malfeasance is ill conduct. Ill conduct measured by what standards?
There are no standards contained elsewhere in the instructions
nor in the statute. The next few words are the most uncertain
and ambiguous of all: ctthe doing of what one ought not
to do." Perhaps one member of a jury might think a Commissioner should attend every Commission meeting, and that
a commissioner was guilty of malfeasance if he were absent
for a day. Perhaps another might think that a Commissioner
should have decided a certain discretionary matter in one
way, whereas he had decided it in another way. To hold each
one of us guilty of malfeasance for ctthe doing of what one
ought not to do" certainly imposes upon mere mortals a
Christ-like standard of conduct.
The purpose of instructions to a jury is to lay down for
the jury specific standards and guides for their deliberation.
It is to insure that each member of the jury will approach
the set of facts with the same attitude and the same standards
as every other juror, with the same attitude and the same
standards as the trial judge, and with the same attitude and
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with the same standards as were intended by the legislature.
This vague and uncertain instruction does not do that for a
jury. It lays down no objective tests. It allows each member
of the jury to decide for himself what is right and what is
wrong. This much is certain. Between the wholly bad and
the wholly good there are infinite shades of gray, one fading
into the other with scarcely perceptible change. Furthermore,
the degree of change is to a large extent in the eye of the
beholder. That the words ((evil doing," (till conduct," ((the
doing of what one ought not to do" are indefinite and uncertain in their meaning is too clear to require further
comment.
Instruction 3, in which the court attempts to apply tests
and standards to the evidence in this case, does nothing to
correct the uncertainties and ambiguities in Instruction 2, for
the reason that Instruction 3 is based upon and presupposes
a complete understaiding by the jury of the elements of malfeasance, which as has been pointed out, the instruction had
failed to give them, because of its uncertainness and indefiniteness, and also because of the inherent inability to give any
certainness and definiteness to the word ((malfeasance."
In giving his definition of malfeasance, the court obviously
picked the language used from certain dicta in the case of
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, at page 413. It should be pointed
out, however, that Law v. Smith does not involve itself with
the question of instructions to the jury, because that case
never got to the stage of giving instructions. Furthermore, the
definition of malfeasance contained in Law v. Smith, and
\vhich is picked up and used in the instruction in this case, is
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not set forth by the court as a proper instruction. The court
sets forth the language given as ((the ordinary definition
given to the term (malfeasance' by lexicographers." Certainly
it is not sufficient that a jury be instructed as to the elements
of an offense by reading a mere dictionary definition of the
offense concerned. An instruction requires more than mere
lexicography. Otherwise an instruction to a jury could be
brief in the extreme. Mere general definitions usually are so
brief as to leave much to the subjective interpretation of the
person reading the dictionary.
That the judge realized that he was leaving the matter
up to the objective standards of the jury is evident from the
remarks which he made during the motion for a new trial
(R. 375).
((We get down to the propostion of whether or not
eight jurors in a case like this think a man should be
discharged or not. After all what you are doing is
discharging a man from his job. In big corporations
the boss fires one and in this instance it takes eight
jurors to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the man should be discharged."
The judge vvas consistent with this throughout the instructions. He left it up to the members of the jury as to whether
under their own standards of what they felt \vas right and
what they felt was wrong, the defendant should be fired from
his office of City Commissioner.
Another portion of the instructions relating to what constitutes malfeasance is highly improper. This element runs
throughout the instructions and this theory is found in Instructions 2, 3 and 6. The court instructed the jury to the effect
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that a person was guilty of n1alfeasance if he did, while holding
a public office, an act which was prohibited by law, whether
or not he had any evil intent or motive, and whether or not
he knew of the existence of the law, because, to quote the
language of the court in regard to knowledge: C(This latter
elen1ent the law imputes to every person, because the law conclusively presumes that all persons know the law and ignorance
thereof is no defense or excuse." The presumption of knowledge of the law does not extend from the criminal law into
malfeasance cases. This was clearly set out in the case of
Law v. Smith, supra. In that case the defendant had presented a
false claim which was in direct violation of law. The court,
however, held that such \Vas not enough in and of itself;
that such claim must be presented C(with full knowledge that
he had no legal right to the money." It certainly was not the
intention of the legislature to make a public officer removable
from office as a matter of law any time he deviated from
the law regarding the fulfillment of his duties, whether or
not he knew at the time that he was violating the law. Malfeasance requires a guilty knowledge and an intent to do wrong
in all cases and not mere inadvertence, negligence or even
failure to know the law.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT NO. I
OF THE ACCUSATION.
POINT IV. 'THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION
OF WITNESSES PRIOR TO THE TRIAL, OR IN THE AL25
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TERNATIVE, THE RIGHT TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY
HEARING.
POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AS TO
COUNTS 2 AND 3, MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
DISMISSJ}.L OF COUNT I, AND ALSO IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
A. General
Counsel desires to discuss the three points listed above
jointly, as they all are concerned with the rather involved story
of what happened to Count No. 1 and its effect upon the
deliberations of the jury in this case.
The evidence as to Count No. 1 is set out in the introductory portion of this brief. The evidence was insufficient
to establish a public offense because the evidence does
not show that Commissioner Geurts had received any reward, promise of reward, or had any expectation of a reward
at the time he joined with the other City Commissioners in
voting to purchase the Hansen property for the city. That
such an element must exist in order to sustain a charge of
v;rongdoing on the part of a public official is well established
by the decided cases, which will be hereafter reviewed.
The indictment from the grand jury on the criminal case
charged the defendant with the commission of acts which
constitute Count 1, as we have set it forth heretofore. This
count of the indictment did not charge that Commissioner
Geurts received the money or had a promise of expectation
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that he would receive the money prior to the time the Hansen
property was purchased for the golf course, nor did it allege
that the receipt of the money in any way affected his action
as a city commissioner. Counsel for the defense moved to
quash this count of the indictment because it failed to so
charge. After giving the district attorney an opportunity to
amend the indictment, which he failed to do, Judge Faux
quashed this count of the criminal indictment. When th~
district attorney some eight months later filed his accusation
in the civil case, he recharged the allegations in Count 1
in almost the identical form as that in which they had been
charged in the criminal indictment. The defendant once again
moved to dismiss Count 1 from the accusations on two
grounds-first, that its dismissal in the criminal action was res
adjudicata; and secondly, that it still had the same inherent
defect, namely, that it did not charge that Commissioner
Geurts had received the money or a promise of money prior
to his official action, or that the receipt of the money affected
his official action (R. 3).
At the argument on this motion to dismiss, which was
very heated, counsel for the defense stated to the trial court
that the District Attorney did not have evidence of any promise
of payment prior to the official act; that he knew he did not
have it; that he knew that he could never get Count 1 to a
jury. His sole purpose in attempting to reestablish this count
was in the hope that the rather inflammatory nature of this
evidence so far as the arousing of suspicion is concerned
would aid him to get a conviction on Counts 2 and 3. The
District Attorney denied this, and orally stated to Judge Van
Cott during the argument that he did have evidence to show
27
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that Comm.issioner Geurts had an agreement to be paid money
for his vote prior to the time his vote was cast. On this oral
representation Judge Van Cott denied the motion to dismiss.
Counsel for the defense was certain in his own mind that
the district attorney had no such evidence, as we believed
that we had talked to all of the witnesses that knew anything
about this particular matter. Accordingly, we filed a demand
with the district attorney for a list of all of the witnesses whom
he would use to prove Count 1 (R. 8). Thereupon we gave
notice of the taking of the depositions of all of these \vitnesses (R. 13). The district attorney moved the court for
an order suppressing our right to take the depositions of these
witnesses. Judge Van Cott granted this motion. Thereupon
counsel for the defendant moved for a preliminary hearing
as to the accusations. This motion was denied.
At the trial of this case the evidence as to Count 1 came
in just as the counsel for the defense had told the court during
the argument that it would come in. The district attorney
had none of the evidence which he had represented he would
have. The evidence was fatally defective in the same manner
that the charge itself Vv~as fatally defective. The court thereupon granted the motion of the defense to dismiss Count 1
(R. 276). Thereafter counsel for the plaintiff moved the court
to grant a mistrial as to Counts 2 and 3 on the ground that
the evidence which they had received as to Count 1 could
not help but affect the delibertions of the jury as to the other
two counts (R. 318). This motion was denied. Following the
verdict the counsel for the defense moved for a new trial
on the ground, among others, that the jury might well have
28
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been influenced in its deliberations by the evidence which it
had heard as to Count 1 ( R. 62) . This motion for a new
trial was denied.
The inflammatory nature of the evidence in Count 1 is
quite evident. While the evidence does not prove any public
ofi"ense, it is of such a nature as to give rise to a great deal
of speculation and suspicion, especially in view of the well
recognized tendency on the part of members of the public to
suspect the worst of public officials, and the further fact that
the general public regards the making of campaign contributions as a rather tainted activity. Having this evidence
before the jury could not help but affect their deliberations
on the other counts. It could not help but affect their general
attitude toward Commissioner Geurts. The district attorney
was well aware of this. His actions in this matter show a
complete lack of good faith. l-Ie knew when he reinstated
Count 1 by tneans of accusation that he could not prove an
offense. He knew he could not prove an offense when he represented to Judge Van Cott at the time of the argument on
the motion to dismiss that he had sufficient evidence. He
wanted that count in, not because he hoped to get to a jury
on it, but because he believed it would color the deliberations
of the jury.
In the argument on the motion for new trial counsel for
the defense called the district attorney to the stand. The
district attorney was asked this question:
ttl will ask you whether or not it is true that shortly
before this accusation was :filed on February 15, you
told Mr. Boden in substance and effect that you were
filing this civil proceeding for the purpose of reinstating
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Count I because you knew, without that, you couldn't
hope for a conviction?" (R. 369).
After a number of evasive answers and repetitions of the
question, the district attorney finally admitted:
t(A. Well, I could have made that statement to him.
However, I maintain that I could get a conviction
on aonther count-Count 2" (R. 370).
Apparently the district attorney achieved his purpose. He did
Mit get before the jury the evidence in Count 1, even though
he did not get that count to the jury, and he did get his conviction on Count 2.
B. Point III
We maintain that the court erred in denying the motion
to quash Count 1 for two reasons: First, the action of Judge
Faux in the criminal case was res adjudicata; and second, the
same reasons for dismissal that were present in the criminal
case were present in the civil case.
1. Res Adjudicata

It is a fundamental principle of law that there can be
only one action for the redress of one wrong. Once a matter
has been determined and the parties have had their day in
court, the matter is settled and ended. In civil practice this
principle is referred to as t(red adjudicata," and in criminal
la\v it is referred to as ((double jeopardy." However, the
principle is the same in each case.
In order for this doctrine to have application, three conditions must exist:
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(a) The actions must be between the same parties or
between parties having a privity with each other.
(b) The issues must be the same, and
(c) The relief sought must be the same.
It matters not that one action may be criminal in nature
and another civil in nature if in fact the above conditions
are met. There is no hard and fast distinction between the
administration of civil justice and criminal justice. Both are
handled in the same courts. It is true that in many cases a
single act may give rise to both criminal and civil actions which
may both proceed to judgment. This results from the fact
that often only the second of the above three identities exists.
As a usual thing, while the defendant may be the same person,
the plaintiffs are different parties, the plaintiff in a criminal
action being the state, and the plaintiff in the civil action being
the person wronged. As a usual thing also, the relief sought
is different, the object of the criminal action being punishment
and the object of the civil action being remedial.
The following language is found in 30 Am. fur. 1005:
ccThe general rule that a judgment rendered in a
criminal action rna y not be received in evidence in a
subsequent civil action to bar such action, or to establish the truth of the facts upon which it was rendered,
is subject to a number of well-defined exceptions.
Thus, where the subsequent action, although civil in
form, is quasi-criminal in its nature, it is frequently
regarded as a second prosecution for the same offense,
and as such, barred by a prior conviction or acquittal.
This exception to the general rule is recognized, however, only where the object of the quasi-criminal or
penal action is punishment and not compensation."
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In this case the relief sought in the existing action is
identical with a portion of the relief sought in the criminal
action, namely, removal from office.
A United States Supreme Court case which discusses the
matter is the case of Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 397, 82
L. ed 921. In that case the defendant was convicted of income
tax evasion. The government also proceeded against him in
a civil action attempting to collect a fraud penalty on the same
set of facts that give rise to the criminal action. The court
held that because the relief sought was different, namely,
punishment in the one case and compensation in the another,
both cases could proceed independently. It went on to point
out, however, that if the object of the two actions had been
the same that both could not proceed, and that either a conviction or acquittal as to one would be a bar to the other.
In the case now before the court the parties were identical,
the issues were identical. All of the relief sought in this case,
namely removal from office, was provided by the statute under
which the criminal case was brought. It would be impossible
to find two cases where the three identities discussed above are
more clearly present. The fact that one is a criminal case with
civil overtones, while the other is sort of a hybrid-civil-criminal
case, does not destroy this identity.
Counsel for the defendant knows of nothing either in the
statutes or the decided cases \-vhich would indicate that the
state in a situation such as this may have two bites at the same
apple.
2. The Allegations of the Accusation
Let us now pass from the question of res adjudicata to
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the merits of the matter and determine whether or not Count
1 of the accusation did state an offense.

AI though there is some minor difference in the language
between Count 1 in this case anad Count 1 in Case No. 16525,
the allegations are identical. In each of them the charge is
made that the defendant accepted a real estate commission,
or a portion thereof which in some vague way, not stated or
shown, is related to a transaction which the city made in
purchasing certain property. We had already been through
this matter once \vith Judge Faux as to whether or not such an
allegation states a public offense. Judge Faux ruled that it
did not.
The fatal defect in Count 1 of the Accusation, as in
Count 1 of the indictment, is that the State does not state
the reason that the defendant received a part of the commission. From all that appears, it might reasonably be assumed
that the real estate agent used a portion of the commission
to purchase items at a store owned by the defendant or that
he used a portion of the commission to pay off a loan which
he owed to the defendant. As a matter of fact, what happened,
and what the District Attorney knew happened, is that the
real estate agent made a political contribution to the defendant.
The crux of the matter is why did he make it? If the payment
was made for the purpose of influencing the defendant's vote
on the City Commission, then the defendant is guilty of a
public offense, regardless of the guise under which it was
made. On the other hand, if the payment was not made for
the purpose of influencing the defendant's vote, it is not
unlawful, regardless of whether it was given as a gratuity or
otherwise.
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\Y/hat the State was attempting to do was to imply,
without saying so, that the defendant took a bribe. It was
attempting to accuse by innuendo, by casting suspicion. An
accusation put in this light makes it impossible for the defendant to assert a defense, for he could have done the act
of which he is accused without commiting any offense.
The District Attorney was evident!y attempting by the
language used in court to bring the allegation under Sec.
10-6-38, U.C.A. 1953, prohibitng officers of municipal corporations from being directly or indirectly interested in any
contract, work or business, or in the sale of any article, the
expense, price or consideration of which is paid from the
treasury. Under this section the District Attorney fails to
state facts sufficient to bring the matter within the statute.
It is necessary, to be a violation of this statute, that at the time
of the transaction with the city the officer have an interest.
The purpose of this statute is clear. A public officer in voting
upon a public matter should have the public interest at heart.
He should not be serving two masters. He should not have
any reason other than his duty as a public official to vote for
or against the purchase of any property. Therefore, it follows
that the interest must be a present one, one existing at the
time the property is purchased. It follows, therefore, that in
order to violate this statute the public officer must either have
received or have been promised, or must have an expectation
that he will receive a reward if he votes in a certain \Yay. This
the District Attorney did not charge.
The requirements of an allegation to state a cause of action
under 77-7-1, U.C.A. 1953, are identical with the requirements
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under Sec. 10-6-36, U.C.A. 1953, or if anything, the requirements are stronger under 77-7-1, whereunder this charge is
laid. 77-7-1 makes an officer removable for "high crimes,
misdemeanors, or malfeasance." Sec. 10-6-36 makes removable
any officer who shall c «wilfully omit the performance of any
duty or wilfully and corruptly be guilty of oppression, malconduct or misfeasance in office." Thus, it will be seen that
Sec. 10-6-36 is by far the broader section. It encompasses
everything encompassed in 77-7-1, and something besides.
Therefore, it follows sylogistically that any charge which fails
to state an offense under 10-6-36 could not state an offense
under 77-7-1.
This very matter has been passed upon by the courts in
a number of jurisdictions. In the case of People v. DeysherJ
40 P. 2d 259, the Supreme Court of California had before
it a situation where the Supervisor of county roads was indicted
under a charge that he had leased road machinery to a contractor to whom had previously been awarded a contract
for improving county rodas. The section under which the
indictment vvas laid was almost identical with Sec. 10-6-38,
U.C.A. 1953. This California statute, Sec. 4322 of the Code,
provided in pertinent part:
CCNo member of the board may be interested, directly
or indirect! y * * * in any contract made by the board,
or other person, on behalf of the county, for the * * *
improvement of roads * * * ."
In considering the question as to when the interest of the
board member must arise in order to constitute a violation
of the statute, the Supreme Court stated:
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((Neither the briefs nor our own investigation has
disclosed any case deciding what facts sufficiently
establish such an interest in a public contract as will
subject an officer to punishment under said section 71
or similar statute. But aid can be obtained from civil
cases considering the sufficiency of evidence to prove
such an interest of an officer in a public contract as
to invalidate it. Outside of a general discussion of
the public policy, underlying the statutory prohibition,
the cases of Stockton P. & S. Co. v. Wheeler, 68 Cal.
App. 592, 229 P. 1020; County of Shasta v. Moody,
90 Cal. App. 519, 265 P. 1032; Hobbs, Wall & Co.
v. Moran, 109 Cal. App. 316, 293 P. 145; Moody v.
Shuffleton, 203 Cal. 100, 262 P. 1095, cited by respondent, are not presently helpful, because in each
case the prohibited interest existed at the award of
contract. The purchase, after award of contract and
without previous agreement so to do, by the contract
of material used in the performance of the contract
from a member of the board awarding the contract,
or from a corporation of which such member is a
stockholder or employee, does not create, in such
member, an interest in the contract which will invalidate it."
To the satne effect see State v. Abernathy, a Louisiana
case, 194 So. 19. In the case of W an·ell t'. Jurden, a Nevada
case, 132 Pac. 1158, the school district entered into a contract
for the construction of a building. Thereafter the contractor
purchased from a board member certain materials which
went into the building. The contract was attacked as being
illegal because of this purchase. The court held that the contract did not violate the statute unless the board member had
acquired or had been promised an interest in the contract
at the time he voted thereon, or had other interest therein
that might influence his vote.
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In the case of O'Neil v. Town of Auburn, a Washington
case, reported at 135 Pac. 1000, a contractor was awarded a
road contract from the city. Thereafter he purchased cement
from a company owned by the Mayor. It was alleged that the
contract with the city was illegal under a statute similar to
the conflict of interest statutes in the state of Utah. The
court held that there was no violation of the contract unless
the conflict of interest existed at the time of awarding the
contract.
The same matter was passed upon by the New Jersey
cour tin the case of Fredericks v. Burrough of Wanaque, 112
Atl. 309:
''But v;e are referred to no case which intimates
that in the absence of a corrupt understanding or
agreement of the contractor with the member of the
council voting for the contract, for the purpose of asserting the provisions of the Crimes Act, a resolution
of its municipality, otherwise legal is rendered illegal
by the subsequent action of the contractor in purchasing
his material from a recognized source of supply, the
proprietor of which happened to be a member of the
governing body which awarded the contract. The contention of the defendant quite obviously is resolvable
upon the fallacious argument of conduct post hoc and
not proper hoc; for the manifest test of the legality
of the contract must be determined as of the time when
the resolution was passed and not by the free act of
the plaintiff in purchasing materials. If it u·as free
of criminal taint at its inception, the subsequent action
of the contractor in executing the contract cannot relate
back, so as to vitiate it: unless such ex post facto
action can be connected with a prior corrupt agreement
or understanding with a member of the governing body
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in pursuance of which the resolution was passed."
Italics added) .
Another similar case is the case of People v. Southern
Surety Company, a Michigan case, 163 N.W. 769. There the
Supreme Court of Michigan stated:
((The court found as a matter of fact that prior to
the making of the contracts between Jansma and the
city there was no talk, agreement, contract or understanding between plaintiff and Jansma to the effect
that defendant Jansma would purchase any material
from the plaintiff for such improvement and with this
finding of fact, we agree. Broadly stated and carried
to its logical conclusion, the position of the defendant
is that an alderman is prohibited by the charter provision under consideration from sustaining any business relationships whatsoever with any person who
has a contract with the municipality of which he is
an officer. We are of the opinion that it was not the
legislative intention to carry the inhibition so far."
The defendant in this case violated no law or committed
no act of malfeasance unless he was given a promise of something prior to the time the city purchased the property in
question. If it is the position of the State that every public
officer who has received a political contribution from an individual who had theretofore done business with the public
body with which such officer was connected, then indeed there
are few, if any, public officers within the State of Utah who
are not subject to removal from office.
POINT IV
Count 1 should therefore have been dismissed prior to
the trial on the motion made by the defendant. Upon the
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denial of this motion for dismissal, the defendant then attempted to take the depositions of the State's witnesses, or in
the alternative to have a preliminary hearing. Had either of
these procedures been allowed, the defective character of the
evidence so far as it pertained to Count 1 would have come
to the attention of the court and the defendant could either
have renewed the motion for dismissal, based upon the evidence, or have moved for a summary judgment. We were
denied the right of either the civil remedy or the criminal
remedy.
The rules of criminal procedure of the State of Utah
provide that before a person can be held to trial in the District
Court on a felony charge brought on complaint and information, he must be given a preliminary hearing before a
magistrate. The twofold purpose of this is obvious. It is a
safeguard that the individual will not be called to stand
trial before a jury in the district court unless there is sufficient
evidence to go to the jury as to the con1mission of the offense.
Secondly, it assures that extraneous matters will not get before
the jury.
The same safeguard is given to parties tn civil actions.
Under the code of civil procedure the parties have the right
to take the depositions of witnesses prior to the trial. Depositions serve a three-fold purpose--1, perpetuation of testimony; 2, discovery; and 3, to form a basis for a motion for
sumn1ary judgment where it appears that the evidence taken
as a whole is insufficient to take a case to a jury. Had the
defendant been granted either of the rights guaranteed to
defendants under the code of criminal procedure or the code
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of civil procedure, the evidence under Count 1 would never
have been heard by the jury. The trial court, however, held
that because this was a quasi-criminal case, the defendant
was afforded the protection of neither mode of procedure.
Certainly this does not appear to be a logical deduction to
draw from the applicable statutes. The cases from this court
hold that removal proceedings under Chapter 77, Title 7, are
civil in nature. See Burk v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711;
Skeen v. Payne, 32 Utah 295, 90 P. 440; Skeen v. Craig, 31
Ut 29 86 P. 487. Based upon these cases, the court held that
we were not entitled to the protection afforded defendants
under the rules of criminal procedure. On our attempt to obtain
the rights afforded to defendants in civil cases, the trial court
denied us these rights, based upon the provisions of Section
77-7-11, Utah Code Annotated, which provides:
((The trial must be by jury and shall be conducted
in all respects in the same manner as the trial of an
indictment or information for a felony."
We urge upon the court that the obvious intention of this
section is that only the trial of the case, and not the procedure
prior to trial, shall be governed by the rules of criminal procedure. Sections 77-7-5 to 77-7-10 inclusive are concerned
with matters preceding trial. As to these matters the code of
criminal procedure cannot be applicable. The section above
quoted obviously refers only to the trial itself, and not to those
matters preceding or following the trial. We therefore should
have had the rights granted to parties under the code of civil
procedure, and, having been denied those rights, have been
denied the due process of law guaranteed to defendants in
the courts of the State of Utah.
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Having failed to secure the dismissal of Count 1, due to
the defect \vhich appeared on its face, and having been denied
the right to test the sufficiency of the evidence at pretrial
proceedings, the defendant, at the close of the state's evidence,
did the only thing he could do to protect himself. Following
the dismissal of Count 1 he moved for a mistrial on the other
t\vo counts (R. 318). That this should have been granted
appears too clear to require argument.
As has been pointed out above, although the facts proved
under Count 1 do not constitute an offense, they do give rise
to innuendos and suspicions which are much more serious
in their nature than anything that was proved under Counts
2 and 3. The suspicion of the jury could not help but have
been aroused. ·The things they had heard in support of Count
1 could not have helped but color the attitude of any juror
untrained in the law toward the defendant in the case. The
instruction of the judge that they were to disregard the
evidence let in as to Count 1 did no more than to accentuate
the effects of this evidence in the minds of the jury. We agree
that there is a large measure of discretion in the trial judge
as to whether or not occurrences which happen during the
trial are of such a nature as to prejudice the rights of the
defendant. However, such discretion is not unlimited, and
in a case such as this it appears clearly an abuse of discretion
to deny the motion for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of t~1e
State of Oregon in the case of Guedon v. Rooney, 87 P. 2d.
209, in overriding the discretion of the trial court in denying
a motion for mistrial, stated:
nln view of the entire record we are strongly of the
opinion that a mistrial should have been ordered by
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the circuit court. In the first place, the court committed
error in permitting English to give in evidence his conclusion as to the manner in which Wilson was driving.
Furthermore, the inferences conveyed to the jury on
the extended direct examination of Rooney by the
the plaintiff, when he was recalled to the stand, were
extremely prejudical. The statements of the annontator
in the A.L.R. notes to Paul v. Drawn, 108 V. 458,
189 A. 144, 109 A.L.R. 1085, are peculiarly appropriate as applied to that examination of Rooney:
(( tlmproper questions may be prejudicial in various
ways, including the following: They may plainly convey information excluded by the rules of evidence;
may hint at the existence of significant though admissible facts, with or ·without a suggestion as to their
nature, may, by the assumptions therein contained, and
notwithstanding, the answers being prevented, impress
upon the jury, by a mere show of proof, matters which
are not admissible in evidence and which perhaps could
not be proved, as inferred, even if opportunity were
afforded, and may, by reason of the objections made,
emphasize the facts suggested more effectively than
might be done by answers admitted without objection.'
(( It seems to be the invariable quality of questions
the asking of which may require a reversal that in
themselves, and without any answers made, they call to
the attention of, or suggest to, the jury some fact or
claim prejudical to the opposite party and concerning
which counsel has no right to inquire."

ttWe are not unmindful of the rule that wide discretion is vested in the trial court in deciding whether
a mistrial shall be declared. That discretion, however,
is not absolute. No general rule, it is true, can be laid
down as to what specific set of circumstances will result
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in a mistrial. We are of the opinion, from all the
facts in the case before us, that the defendants did not
have a fair trial."
Here the situation is much more serious than a case where
simply a few improper questions were asked and answered.
Here a full day's trial was devoted to the abortive effort to
prove Count 1. This court is aware from the preceding discussion in this brief as to the inflammatory nature of that
evidence. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the court
dismissed Count 1 on motion of the defendant, the defendant
could not put in his own evidence to show his interpretation
of the facts of Count 1. These facts were left before the jury
in their most damaging form.
As the District Attorney reluctantly admitted under
oath that he had stated, there would probably have been no
conviction under the other two counts had the jury not heard
the evidence as to Count 1. The motion for a mistrial should
clearly have been granted at the close of the State's evidence,
and the motion for a new trial should have been granted as
to Counts 2 and 3 on the ground that the jury had been
improperly influenced by the evidence which they heard as
to Count 1.
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF THE DEFENDANT TO
THE JUROR RAY H. WILSON.
POINT VII. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE JURORS IKEDA AND JENSEN HAD ANSWERED FALSELY TO CERTAIN VOIR
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DIRE QUESTIONS, WHICH FALSE ANSWERS HAD
PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT FROM TAKING A
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE FROM INTELLIGENTLY EXERCISING HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
During the voir dire examination of the Juror Wilson
the following occurred:
((THE COURT: And I don't want to know what your
opinion is, if you have one. I say we don't want to know
what it is, but do you at this time have an opinion
about the truth or the falsity of these accusations7
((Mr. Wilson: I have an opinion but I might be able
to change it in case the evidence showed it wrong.
((THE COURT: Do you believe that it would require
evidence to remove the opinion that you now have?
((Mr. Wilson: I think so."
The court then went on with a rather lengthy examination
of the juror Wilson, in which he explained to him the presumption of innocence and the necessity for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Wilson agreed with these principles and
said that he would attempt to follow them. At one point during
the questioning by the judge as to whether or not he would
require more proof in this case than in another case, he stated:
nWell, if I say yes, I would say it is because I think
public officials should be above reproach in whatever
office they have been elected to, and that there should
be no suspicion of anything of that kind."
As a concluding question the court asked, {{And if you were
a defendant in this case, do you think you would get a fair
and impartial trial if you were sitting on the jury and seven
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uthers like you?" to which Mr. Wilson replied, ((I would
think so." At no time, however, did Wilson change or repudiate
his statement that he had formed an opinion about the case
\vhich it would require evidence to remove. He did not change
his statement that it would require more proof than the average
case.
Counsel challenged Wilson for cause, but the challenge
was denied by the court. Wilson ultimately did serve on the
jury, because in spite of his answers, there were others on the
jury panel who, although they had answered the questions
technically correctly, caused counsel for the defense more
concern than did the juror Wilson and the peremptory challenges were exhausted on these other jurors.
The Juror Ikeda answered the routine question as to
'vhether or not he had formed or expressed an opinion in
the case in the negative. His examination was not extensive.
After the trial of the case, however, counsel learned from a
nephew of the defendant that a short time previous to the
trial of the case the nephew had taken his automobile to
Ikeda's repair shop for some work thereon. Upon hearing
that the nephew's name was ((Geurts," Ikeda asked: ((Are
you related to the crooked Commissioner?'' This information
was placed in the file by affidavit in support of the motion
for new trial (R. 67). Ikeda placed in a counter-affidavit (R.
69). The court denied a motion for new trial on this ground.
One of the things that greatly concerned counsel for the
defense in selecting a jury was the matter of prejudice that
might exist in the minds of prospective jurors arising out of
matters having no connection with the charges against Com45
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mtsstoner Geurts. In the few weeks preceding the trial of
this case there had been before the Commission a number
of very heated hearings, protests and discussions involving
the activities of the Public Safety Department of the city
government and the removal of the chief of police. Feelings
had run high on the matter in the community, and counsel
was very desirous that no member of the jury be a person
that had been involved in any such proceedings. Accordingly,
counsel requested the judge to question the jurors about this
matter. The following appears from the record (R. 124):
((THE COURT:
haven't I asked?

What question, Mr. Rampton,

Mr. Rampton: The question of recent unpleasantness in the City Commission having no connection
with this case, if any of them have engaged in these
citizens committee meetings or protests, and so forth?
THE COURT: Is there any juror that didn't hear
what Mr. Rampton said? All right, if you all heard it, is
there any juror who has been engaged in any of the
matters that he has indicated by his question. Does that
satisfy you on that question?
~1r.

Rampton: Yes.

(There was no affirmative response from any of the
jurors in the panel)."
After the jury retired, but before the verdict was returned,
a man from a radio station covering the trial informed counsel
for the defendant that the juror Jensen had been one of the
instigators of one of the most violent protest meetings that
occurred before the City Con1mission. Jensen, the owner of
a bar and grill, had made complaint to the Mayor that the
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Police Department had ''shaken him down'' by making him
pay certain bills \vhich he did not owe before they would
renew his beer license. These charges resulted in a hearing
before the City Commission, in which Jensen did participate
as a witness and as a moving party. Counsel immediately took
the matter up with the defendant. Co1nmissioner Geurts
informed counsel that the witness Jensen looked familiar to
him. However, during the hearing before the City Commission,
Jensen had sat with his back to Geurts and Geurts could not
positively identify him, but said now that the matter was
brought to his attention that could have been the man (R. 3 55).
Counsel immediately contacted the city attorney, Mr. Barker,
who had conducted the investigation before the City Commission, and was informed that indeed the juror Jensen was
the person involved in the hearing before the City Commission (R. 66). Counsel for the defendant immediately called
this matter to the attention of the trial court (R. 358). The
above facts appear by affidavit and also by evidence taken
in support of the motion for new trial.
This was a case in which extreme care should have been
exercised in the selection of a jury. The case was given wide
publicity by all media of public information. The matter had
been discussed extensively in the community. Furthermore,
in the weeks immediately preceding the trial, feelings in
the community had run high, both for and against members
of the City Commission. Even under the most favorable circumstances it would have been difficult to select a juror who
would not have been prejudiced in this case. In view of these
facts, the court should have exercised its discretion in removing
from the jury any juror that had any prejudice at all, and
4.7
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should have granted a new trial if it appeared that anything
happened during the voir dire examination which would prevent the defendant from intelligently exercising his peremptory challenges. As this court stated in the case of Balle v.
Smith, 17 P. 2d 224, at page 229, ((A litigant is entitled to a
trial before an impartial and disinterested jury, and must be
given reasonable opportunity to obtain such a panel." We are
cognizant of the provisions of Rule 47 (f) ( 6) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides:
((No person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury founded
on public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court
that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to
be submitted to him."
We submit, however, that no Utah case has gone so far as
to say a challenge for cause will not be sustained to a juror
who has formed an opinion where such opinion is so strong
that the juror cannot lay it aside at the beginning of the trial,
and where it will actually take evidence to remove such an
opinion. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, while
this is a civil case, the ((beyond reasonable doubt" standard
of proof applies. How can anyone say that the juror Wilson
could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, when he
went into the case with an opinion \Yhich would remain with
him until the defendant picked up a burden of proof he should
not bear and introduced evidence to remove such opinion?
In the case of

Stt~te

r. Thorne. 41 Utah 414, this court
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sustained a refusal of a trial judge to grant a challenge to a
juror who said that he had forn1ed an opinion as to the guilt
of the defendant. However, in that case the witness Cannon
stated, to use the words of the court, nthat he could and v;ould
lay aside and disregard his present opinion and give appellant
a fair and impartial trial." That is far from what the witness
Wilson said in this case. He did not say he would lay aside his
opinion. He said that his opinion could be removed only by
the introduction of evidence, and strong evidence at that.
The authors of Am. fur. in Vol. 31, page 84, state:
CCDisqualification of one to sit as a juror in a case
does not follow from mere impression, a slight, light
and transient opinion, a temporary, qualified or passing
state of mind concerning the merits of the controversy
based on mere rumor, newspaper accounts or other
hearsay information, where it appears unequivocably
or absolutely that he can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act fairly and impartially and render a verdict
in the case in accordance with the law and the evi,,
dence.
Such a situation did not exist here. It was not a mere impression which Wilson had. It was not a transient opinion. It was
an opinion which he said would stay with him unless it was
removed by evidence. This we submit was the basis for challenge.
The situation here is very much akin to the situation
which existed in the Oklahoma case of Morehead v. State,
151 P. 1183, where the court held that a juror should be
dismissed for cause where he had formed an opinion which
it would take strong evidence to remove, even though he
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stated he could and would, notwithstanding such optnton,
act impartiallyand fairly and render an impartial verdict upon
the law and the evidence. See also People v. McQuade, 110
N.Y. 284, 18 N.E. 156.
The purpose of voir dire examination of jurors, of course,
is to give counsel the necessary information necessarily to exercise his peremptory challenges. If fair and honest answers are
not given to these voir dire questions, this right does not exist
in the defendant. Section 77-38-3, U.C.A. 1953, lists as grounds
for a new trial any misconduct of the jury by which a fair
or due consideration of the cause may have been prevented.
This court has held in a number of cases that failure of jurors
to give fair and true answers on voir dire examinations constitutes such misconduct. In the case of State v. Mickle, 25
Utah 179, 70 P. 856, the court held that previously expressed
bias of a juror, which he did not acknowledge on voir dire,
and which was not known to the defendant or his counsel
until after the trial, was misconduct, warranting the grantings
of a new trial. This case is directly in point as to the juror
Ikeda.
In the case of State v. Thompson, 24 Utah 314, 67 P. 789,
it was held to be misconduct warranting a new trial where
a juror on voir dire failed to disclose that he was a stockholder
in the corporation which owned the store which the defendant
was accused of having burglarized. Obviously, in the Thompson
case, had counsel for the defendant known of this connection,
he would have exercised a peremptory challenge to the juror.
It might reasonably be supposed that the juror would be prejudiced. Likewise on this case, had the juror Jensen disclosed
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his controversy with the City Commission and the Department
of Public Safety, counsel for the defendant would have immediately exercised a peremptory challenge to him because of
the probability of bias in the case. It matters not whether
Jensen's failure to answer resulted from a deliberate attempt
to conceal his activities or from a lack of understanding of
the question. The effect as to the defendant is exactly the
same.
We concede the existence of the rule that the question of
granting or denying challenges to a juror and the question
of granting or denying a motion for new trial based on the
misconduct of jurors is a matter largely within the discretion
of the trial court. Such discretion, however, is not unbounded.
Whether the presence of any one of these three questionable
jurors on the jury panel affected the outcome of the case
cannot be known, of course. However, in view of the high
public feeling in this case, and in further view of the tendency
of the members of the public to regard public officials with
suspicion, which was mentioned by the trial judge during his
examination of the jurors (R. 98), the cumulative effect of
these three jurors might well have been the determining factor
in the returning of a guilty verdict as to Count 2. The court
therefore should have exercised its discretion in favor of
granting the motion for new trial when these facts come to
ltght.
POINT VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION ASKED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER WITNESS SMITH.
'51
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The defendant called Mr. Willard R. Smith as a character
witness. Mr. Smith testified that Commissioner Geurts' reputation for honesty and integrity in the community were very
good. On cross-examination the district attorney asked:
''"'V(! ould you state or would you believe that a man is honest
and has high integrity if he uses city employees' work for
his own gain?" (R. 284). This question was objected to by
the defense. The court overruled the objection and of course
Mr. Smith answered in the negative. This question was
objectionable on two grounds-first, it assumes the truth of
the very matter for which Commissioner Geurts was being
tried; secondly, what Mr. Smith might think or might not
think about Commissoiner Geurts' honesty and integrity are
not an issue in the case. The issue in the case is the general
reputation in the community, and this question on cross examination did not go to that question at all. The court on the
motion for new trial when this ruling was assigned as error
admitted that he had made an error in overruling this objection (R. 373). However, he held that the error was not
prejudical. We would agree that in most circumstances
probably an error of this type would not be of such an important nature as to affect the outcome of the trial. In a case
such as this, however, which is replete with small and large
errors, and where the deliberation of the jury was obviously
balanced on a very narrow edge, any error of any nature at
all might well have been the thing which turned the deliberation.
POINT IX. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT
MADE ON THE GROUNDS THAT CHAPTER 7, SECTION
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77, UTAI-I CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAS BEEN
SUPERSEDED BY RULE 65(b) (1) UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
A review of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that
a removal proceeding, rather than being handled by the District Attorney, should properly be handled by the Attorney
General of the State, under the provisions of Rule 6 5B.
Rule 65B(b) ( 1) reads as follows, in the parts here relevant:
CWhere any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in a corporation created
by the authority of this state; or any public officer, civil
or military, does or permits to be done any act which
by the provisions of law works a forfeiture of his
. . . . ''
off tee
c

This rule was adopted and became effective with all of the
other rules of civil procedure on January 1, 1950 (See Rule
1 (b) ) . Rule 1 (a) states the scope of the rules in the following
language:
(a) Scope of Rules: These rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts,
city courts, and justice courts of the state of Utah, in
all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil nature,
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all
special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule
81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
u

The exception stated in Rule 81 as to the applicability of the
rules deals with special statutory proceedings, and reads as
follows:
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cc (a) Special Statutory Proceedings. These rules shall
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by
reference to any part of the former Code of Civil
Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with
these rules."
There can be no doubt but that the matter before us is a
special statutory proceeding. The District Attorney improperly
proceeded under 77-7-1 and 2, U.C.A. 1953, which Sections
were adopted in 1898. The Utah Rules clearly govern the procedure in the courts of Utah ((in all suits and proceedings of
a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and
in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule
81.'' Rule 81 (a) has been quoted above; (b) refers to Probate
and Guardianship; (c) to City and Justice Courts and (d)
to appeals from adminisrative boards or agencies. Thus Rule
81 (a) requires the Rules ccshall apply in all special statutory
proceedings except insofar as such rules are by their nature
clearly inapplicable."
We strongly assert that the proceeding established by
Rule 56B (b) ( 1) is not excluded by Rule 81 (a) as being
((clearly inapplicable." The converse is true. The power is
lodged specifically in the Attorney General under 56B( c)
to initiate any action authorized by 65B(b) ( 1), either on
his own initiative or at the behest of the Governor. Rule
6 5B (b) ( 1) is an amalgamation of former statutory Quo
Warranto provisions found in Sections 104-66-1 and 104-66-2
(Code 1943).
The language of this Rule prescribes that appropriate
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relief may be granted where n • • • any public officer, ClVll
or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the
provisions of lavv works a forfeiture of his office . . . " This
is exactly what the District Attorney has attempted to have
this court declare in this special statutory proceeding. He has
endeavored to usurp the functions of the Attorney General
and ignore Rule 65B(b) ( 1).
Apparently the District Attorney was in a rare quandary
as to what procedure to follow. He could not adopt the ordinary
criminal procedure as the Grand Jury's indictments were pending and untried. No common law crime or civil remedy was
available under a com plaint procedure. So he has elected to
try a special statutory proceeding enacted in 1898 and file
an Accusation. But this procedure has been terminated and
superseded by Rule 65B(b) ( 1), which is of the nature of
Quo Warranto.
Our Utah Supreme Court said that Quo Warranto is the
correct procedure in this type case in Olsen v. Merrill, 78 Utah
45 3, 5P2d 226. There procedures were initiated to test the
right of certain persons to hold office as members of the
Provo City Board of Education. The procedural question of
whether a Writ of Prohibition or Quo Warranto is the proper
remedy was raised, but the Court held ((a proceeding in the
nature of Quo Warranto is the proper remedy to try title to
a public office where it is sought to oust an incumbent from
an office on the ground that he is not entitled to such office"
(P. 227).
The same basic logic applies to Rule 65B(b) ( 1) and
such is the sole procedural method to be followed. Rule
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6 5B (c) , which requires the Attorney General ~lone to bring
the action, has only one exception, and that is found in Rule
65B( d), which permits a person claiming public office to
file if the Attorney General has been first requested to file
and has failed to do so. No situation of this type applies here.
District Attorney Banks makes no pretense of coming within
this permissive position.
Next, let us consider the procedural aspect of the case.
Had the matter been filed by the Attorney General under
Rule 65B(b) ( 1) as required, there would be no question
but that all of the rules of civil procedure would apply, including the discovery procedures. By deposition the vague and
unsubstantial nature of Count 1 would have been revealed
prior to trial and the matter then would have been disposed
of by Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
Counsel submits that the ruling of the lower court should
be reversed and that this action should be dismissed, first upon
the ground that the statute under which it was brought is
unconstitutional; second, on the ground that the procedural
statute under which it is brought has been superseded. Or if
the court rules adversely to the appellant on the above matters,
then the case should be sent back to the lower court for a new
trial because of the numerous and substantial errors committed
by the trial court, as hereinbefore set forth.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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